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NOTES
practical matter, the mere fact that the purchaser, rather than
the defendant, hauled the heifer away should not preclude the
defendant's criminal liability.
J.S.D.
CRIMINAL LAW-BRIBERY OF A PUBLIC OFFIcER-Defendant, a
city policeman, accepted one hundred dollars upon the pretense
and representation that he could and would improperly influence
the official action of a municipal officer of the city. Defendant
was convicted of bribery and appealed urging that he, being a
policeman, was not a municipal officer, but merely an employee
of the city, and thus was not within the statute making it an
offense to accept a bribe under color of office. The decision of the
lower court was affirmed. State v. Sheffield, 10 So. (2d) 894
(La. 1942).
Originally the offense of bribery was limited to the offering
or giving of a reward to a judge or other person concerned in
the administration of public justice; but the offense was subse-
quently broadened so as to include the receiving or offering of
a reward by or to any person in a public office to influence his
official behavior. Modern statutes cover the bribery of all per-
sons whose official conduct is in any way connected with the ad-
ministration of government, whether general or local, judicial,
legislative or executive.1 Bribery in Louisiana was formerly
covered by numerous conflicting and confusing statutes. In 1878,
however, the legislature enacted a general bribery statute which
was for the purpose of punishing anyone who should offer or
give a bribe, present, or reward to any public officer of the state
with the intent to induce or influence such officer to show par-
tiality or favor contrary to law in the performance of his duty.
The statute also included the asking for or receiving of a bribe.2
These modern statutes were of a comprehensive nature, yet
in some cases they did not appear to be as inclusive as the crim-
inal activity they sought to prescribe. Only public officers were
included, and the question often arose as to whether the accused,
in fulfilling his duty as a public servant, could be designated a
1. Clark and Marshall, A Treatise on the Law of Crimes (4 ed. 1940) 594,
434.
2. La. Act 59 of 1878, as amended by La. Act 162 of 1920, and partly re-
pealed by La. Act 78 of 1890, § 1 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 796]. See redac-
tor's "Comment on Former Statutes," La. Crim. Code (1942) 121.
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public officer within the limitations of the statute. Where the
recipient of the bribe was a mere employee, the statute, which
affected only public officers, would not apply.3
A definite distinction between a public officer and an employee
was needed. In Martin v. United States4 the court said, "Greater
importance, dignity, and independence mark the position of an
officer than that of an employee." Other courts felt that such im-
portance, dignity, and independence were too subjective for a
definite distinction. They adopted an objective standard, the
requirements necessary for a public officer being that (1) his
office be established by the constitution or created by the legisla-
ture, (2) a position of the sovereign power of the government be
delegated to him to be exercised for the public benefit, (3) his
tenure of office be for a fixed period, (4) his salary and emolu-
ments be definitely fixed, and (5) he take the oath of office re-
quired by the constitution. The lack of any one of the above
made the person a mere employee of the state and not an officer
within the intendment of the law.5
In United States v. Ingham, the person accused of bribery
was employed as a substitute to an official and carried out a duty
charged to the latter. The question to be decided involved the
official functions of the act when carried out by a subordinate.
The court held that "the official function spoken of is not neces-
sarily a function.belonging to an office held by a person acting
on behalf of the United States; it may also be a function belong-
3. Krichman v. United States, 256 U.S. 363, 41 S.Ct. 514, 65 L.Ed. 992
(1921).
4. 168 Fed. 198, 202 (C.C.A. 8th, 1909).
5. Metcalf and Eddie v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 46 S.Ct. 172, 70 L.Ed. 384
(1926) (accused held not an officer as employment was not continuous; duties
were only prescribed by contract; and he took no oath of office); Martin v.
United States, 168 Fed. 198 (C.C.A. 8th, 1909) (all requirements were absent
except "taking the oath of office" and court held that that alone could not
create an office); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Harlan, 80 F.(2d) 660
(C.C.A. 9th, 1935) (respondent was officer by all the requirements; however,
the court held that a definite term was not a necessary attribute of an office);
Varden v. Ridings, 20 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Ky., 1937) (sheriff of a county pos-
sessed the necessary requirements); Smith v. Board of Education of Ludlow,
23 F. Supp. 328 (E.D. Ky., 1938) (plaintiff was an officer by possessing all the
requirements); Moll v. Sbisa, 51 La. Ann. 290, 25 So. 141 (1899) (accused held
an officer as all elements were present); Throop v. Langdon, 40 Mich. 673(1879) (a mere clerk whose position as chief clerk in the assessor's office has
not been created is not an officer, but an employee); State ex rel. Barney v.
Hawkins, 79 Mont. 506, 257 Pac. 411, 53 A.L.R. 583 (1927) (only an employee
having no delegation of a position of the sovereign power of the government,
and his employment was terminable at the *will of the board); State ex rel.
Kendall v. Cole, 38 Nev. 215, 148 Pac. 551 (1915) (accused not an officer as no
sovereign power of the state was entrusted to him; his position in every
regard was a contract with the board of directors).
.6. 97 Fed. 935, 936 (E.D. Pa. 1889).
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ing to an office held by his superior, which function has been
committed to the subordinate (whether he be also an officer, or a
mere employee) for the purpose of being executed."
Compare, however, the case of Krichman v. United States,7
where a baggage porter at a railway station, being supervised and
controlled by the United States government, accepted a bribe for
the delivery of a trunk of valuable furs, the court held that the
function of transporting baggage, a clear duty of the government
at that time, was not an official function by the authority of a de-
partment or office of the government and that the porter was not
acting for or on behalf of the United States. Here the porter did
as much harm as the station master could have done by accepting
the bribe, but the court said that not every person performing
any service for the government, however humble, is embraced
within the terms of the statute. It includes only those performing
duties of an official character,8 and the duty of the porter was not
such as was required.
The courts have not been able to arrive at a definition that
will faultlessly fit all cases. They have been compelled to decide
whether, in each case under consideration, the position of a given
person comes fairly within the legislative intendment and con-
templation. Conclusions vary, of course, with the different legis-
lative provisions in the respective jurisdictions and the nature of
the respective cases.9
Louisiana, along with many other states, has solved the fore-
going problem by enlarging the scope of the bribery offense.
Article 118 of the Criminal Code defines public bribery so as to
include both "public officers" and "public employees."'10 Article 2
of the Code broadly defines these terms to include
"any executive, ministerial, administrative, judicial, or legis-
lative officer, office, employee or position of authority respec-
tively, of the state of Louisiana or any parish, municipality,
district, or other political subdivision thereof or any agency,
board, commission, department or institution of said state,
parish, municipality, district or other political subdivision."
7. 256 U.S. 363, 41 S.Ct. 514, 65 L.Ed. 992 (1921).
8. Kellerman v. United States, 295 Fed. 796, 799 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1924).
9. State v. Dark, 195 La. 139, 196 So. 47 (1940), discussed In The Work of
the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1939-1940 Term (1941) 3 LOUISIANA LAW
RaViEw 267, 394.
10. Art. 118(1), La. Crim. Code.
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Had the principal case been decided subsequent to the adoption
of the Criminal Code, the accused would not have been able to
urge seriously that he was an employee of the city, rather than an
officer.
The public bribery article includes the giving and the re-
ceiving of a bribe as did the former statute. It also follows the
common law rule that the offense of bribery is complete upon the
offer or the asking and does not require that the bribe be actu-
ally given or received.11 If the bribe be given for the purpose of
trapping the receiver, undoubtedly the court would hold by the
article that such a purpose would be no defense on the part of
the accused unless the bribe be an inducement.1
2
It has been held that to constitute bribery, the act of at least
two persons is essential, that of him who gives and him who re-
ceives; and the minds of the two must concur, the giving and re-
ceiving being reciprocal. In such a case one would be an accomp-
lice of the other, both parties being guilty.13 The rule at common
law was that either the giver or the taker of the bribe is indict-
able upon his own guilty participation in the transaction, regard-
less of the corrupt intention of the other.14 Such was the rule in
one Louisiana case.'- Our Code has followed the rule of the latter,
holding either of the parties guilty in the event of a participation,
and not looking to the intent of the other party. 6
According to the new Code article, it is not necessary that
the act for which the officer is bribed be one which is within his
lawful authority. If the act is done under the color of office, it
is done officially. This is clearly the weight of authority in other
jurisdictions.17
11. State v. Woodward, 182 Mo. 391, 81 S.W. 857 (1904); State v. Miller,
182 Mo. 370, 81 S.W. 867 (1904); Lee v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. Rep. 620, 85 S.W.
804 (1905).
12. State v. Dudoussat, 47 La. Ann. 977, 17 So. 685 (1895); People v. Lip-
hardt, 105 Mich. 80, 62 N.W. 1022 (1895); Rath v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. Rep. 142,
33 S.W. 229 (1895).
13. State v. Callahan, 47 La. Ann. 444, 17 So. 50 (1895); People v. Coffey,
161 Cal. 433, 119 Pac. 901 (1911); Newman v. People, 23 Colo. 300, 47 Pac. 278
(1896).
14. 1 Russell, The Law of Crimes (1841) 627; 3 Wharton, Criminal Law
(1932) § 2235.
15. See note 12, supra.
16. Art. 118(1), La. Crim. Code.
17. Roberts v. State, 45 Ohio App. 65, 186 N.E. 748 (1933); Wells v. State,
174 Tenn. 552, 129 S.W.(2d) 203 (1939). See also Ex parte Winters, 10 Okla.
Cr. 592, 140 Pac. 164 (1914), where defendant held himself out as an officer,
but asserted as a defense that he was not actually one. It was held that if
he is officer enough to solicit and accept a bribe, he is also officer enough to
be sent to the penitentiary for his conduct.
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As to the nature or value of the bribe, the words "anything of
apparent present or prospective value" include anything from
which the recipient might receive some personal advantage. From
American Jurisprudence,2' "anything may serve as a bribe so
long as it is of sufficient value in the eyes of the person bribed
to influence his official conduct." In one Ohio case 9 a substantial
favor was held to be something of value.
Public bribery, as defined in Article 118 of the Louisiana
Criminal Code, specifically includes election officials and jurors,
as well as public officers and employees. The clause "Grand or
petit juror" contemplates any jurors lawfully selected and sum-
moned to act as such. 0 Any interested witness whether before a
board, civil, or criminal trial is included in the article. He need
not be a witness at the time, but it is enough if he is "about to
be called as a witness."' 21 Voters were not included in the public
bribery article as it was thought best to put this lesser offense
in a category of its own. Article 119 of the Code refers to all
voters, including those at political meetings or conventions. The
penalty for bribery of voters is not as severe as that prescribed
for the general offense of public bribery; and the offense is tri-
able by a judge without a jury.22
The solicitation or acceptance of a bribe strikes at the very
foundation of the honesty and integrity of public officers. There
can scarcely be a more grievous crime committed than that a
public officer should so far forget himself as to solicit or take a
bribe, using his office for the purpose of private gain. Laws against
bribery must be effective, so that when a man is guilty, he shall
be punished. The Louisiana Criminal Code covers bribery with
articles of the broadest scope possible, and it is the opinion of the
writer that this was necessarily and rightfully done. Govern-
mental agencies have made enormous advances of late, because
our economic set-up demands it. Now as never before, we need
this type of control, as a matter of public policy to protect tax-
payers from unscrupulous officials and employees.
J.N.H.
18. 8 Am. Jur. 889 (1937).
19. State v. Scott, 107 Ohio St. 475, 141 N.E. 19 (1923).
20. State v. Glaudi, 43 La. Ann. 914, 9 So. 925 (1891); State v. McCrystol,
43 La. Ann. 907, 9 So. 922 (1891).
21. See redactor's comment on "Witness," La. Crim. Code (1942) 122.
22. See redactor's comment on "Separate Article as to Voters," La. Crim.
Code (1942) 124.
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